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Several studies have claimed that changes in the political leadership of a
country affect foreign policy decision making. The following paper sys-
tematically tests this in the context of states’ participation in military
coalition operations. By building on previous theoretical models, the
authors argue that new leaders may differ from their predecessors in
that the former (i) have dissimilar preferences with regard to the
involvement in military interventions, (ii) evaluate relevant information
differently, and (iii) are less likely to be entrapped in intervention poli-
cies. Ultimately, the net effect of these factors should make it more
likely that political leadership turnovers are associated with premature
withdrawals from ongoing military coalitions. The theory is tested by
quantitative analyses of newly collected data on military coalition opera-
tions in 1946–2001 and a qualitative case study. The authors find strong
and robust support for their argument.
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After the Spanish Prime Minister Jose Marıa Aznar lost the parliamentary
elections in March 2004, the successor, Jose Zapatero, fulfilled his campaign
promise less than two months after the electoral victory and brought home the
1,300 Spanish soldiers who had been fighting in Iraq. Likewise, French President
Nikolas Sarkozy lost the elections against the socialist Francois Hollande in May
2012. Immediately afterward, Hollande announced the beginning of the with-
drawal of the French combat troops from Afghanistan for July 2012. This process
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was completed in November 2012, about two years ahead of the planned transi-
tion of the security responsibility to the Afghan government.
This anecdotal evidence points to the impact of political leadership turnover2
on foreign policy decision making in general and on the reliability of states’
commitments to military coalition operations in particular. Surprisingly, however,
while there is a growing literature on the origins and conduct of such multilat-
eral military interventions (Tago 2005, 2007, 2009; Kreps 2011; Morey 2011;
Pilster 2011; Tierney 2011; Vucetic 2011), the scholarly literature lacks systematic
theorizing and empirical evidence that may improve our understanding of how
leadership turnover is in fact related to early withdrawals from military coali-
tions.
In order to contribute to addressing this limitation, we thoroughly test
whether changes in a country’s political leadership make it more likely that it
will prematurely withdraw from an ongoing military coalition operation, that is,
an operation that has not (yet) been officially terminated. To this end, we
extend Stanley’s (2009; see also Stanley and Sawyer 2009) theoretical framework
and argue that new political leaders are likely to differ from their predecessors
in at least three aspects. First, new leaders may have preferences about military
interventions that differ from the interests of the previous incumbent. Second,
new leaders could evaluate information, which is relevant for military operations
and their success, differently. Third, new leaders may be less entrapped in ongo-
ing military intervention policies stemming from domestic constituencies or
foreign allies. Ultimately, political leadership turnover is likely to induce lower
political costs arising out of defection and different evaluations of the net bene-
fits, which a country can derive from military coalition operations. This increases
the risk that countries withdraw their troops from coalition operations before
they terminate officially (see also Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer 2009; Croco
2011).
This theoretical argument and our corresponding empirical analysis may have
important policy implications and could not only increase our knowledge about
military coalition operations, but also security commitments in general. For
example, knowing the factors that drive a premature withdrawal from military
operations helps policymakers in assessing their allies’ degree of reliability (see,
for example, Leeds 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). Besides, the existent
research largely ignores leadership changes during wartime and, more generally,
during states’ participation in any kind of military operation. Despite recent
advancements in this respect (for example, Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer
2009; see also Croco 2011), many issues such as the actual underlying mecha-
nisms remain unaddressed. Our research seeks to contribute to this by examin-
ing the impact of executive leadership change during military coalition
operations on the defection from those interventions. Finally, our empirical work
adds to previous studies by introducing newly compiled data on leadership
changes and all military coalitions for 1946–2001, and by explicitly taking into
account that changes in the political leadership are unlikely to be a randomly
selected set. Next to standard parametric models and a case study, we therefore
employ matching techniques for the empirical test of our theory.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
relevant literature. This allows us to clarify the contribution of our research
more carefully. Afterward, we outline a theoretical framework that seeks to
explain the likely impact of political leadership turnovers on the risk of prema-
ture withdrawals from military coalition operations. By employing data on all
military coalition operations between 1946 and 2001, we then test our
2We use the terms “leadership change” and “leadership turnover” interchangeably. However, the terms “(prema-
ture) withdrawal/defection” and “termination” with regard to military coalition operations are different.
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argument via a multi-methods approach, that is, a quantitative parametric analy-
sis, non-parametric matching techniques, and a most similar design case study.
We conclude with a discussion of our findings and the implications of our
research.
Leadership Changes, Conflict Behavior, and Security Commitments
Two streams in the literature are particularly relevant for our research: first, stud-
ies on the influence of leader changes on nations’ conflict behavior and, sec-
ondly, the work examining the effects of leadership turnovers on the reliability
of security commitments.
With regard to the first stream, there are multiple qualitative studies that high-
light the importance of changes in a country’s political leadership for the contin-
uation or termination of military interventions. Downs (1992:294ff), for instance,
argues that a protracted intervention only ends after the leadership, which initi-
ated it in the first place, has been replaced. He supports his claim by outlining
this mechanism for campaigns in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Angola, and
Sri Lanka. Similarly, Vertzberger (1998) demonstrates with case studies of the
United States in Vietnam and Israel in Lebanon that substantial changes in mili-
tary intervention policies are usually preceded by turnovers of the relevant deci-
sion makers. Finally, Bennett (1999) emphasizes the importance of leadership
successions for the Soviet propensity to resort to military interventions, while
Stanley (2009) shows how executive turnover contributed to the end of the
Korean War.
Quantitative evidence also supports these studies’ findings. For example,
Croco (2011) argues that culpable leaders, that is, leaders who preside over the
beginning of a war are likely to continue fighting in the face of hardship, since
the domestic audience will punish them in the case of defeat. Furthermore,
Goemans (2000) shows that a nondemocratic leader might particularly fear dis-
pleasing the domestic audience, because punishment could involve repercussions
that go beyond being “simply” removed from office. Chiozza and Choi (2003)
find that newly inaugurated democratic leaders are more likely than “old” politi-
cal leaders to apply peaceful conflict management techniques in territorial dis-
putes. Likewise, McGillivray and Stam (2004) present evidence that leadership
changes influence the duration of economic sanctions. This finding, however,
only pertains to nondemocratic states. Moreover, Stanley and Sawyer (2009)
demonstrate that political leadership turnovers increased the likelihood of inter-
state war termination between 1816 and 2006. The authors suggest that new
leaders are less likely than their predecessors to be affected by informational
biases and are less entrapped in existing policies. Similarly, according to Koch
and Sullivan (2010), changes in the ruling party increase the likelihood that a
democratic major power will withdraw from its military interventions short of vic-
tory. Finally, Flores (2012) theoretically argues and empirically finds that leader
changes in autocratic systems are more likely than leader transitions in demo-
cratic states to bring interstate wars to an end (see also Jones and Olken 2009).
With regard to the second stream in the literature, studies on the reliability of
security commitments also increasingly consider political leadership changes.
Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004:781) demonstrate that regular leadership turnovers
make democratic commitments in the form of military alliances less reliable.
Essentially, administrations deciding whether to honor a commitment or not
might feel less bound by commitments that were established by their predeces-
sors. Furthermore, Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009) examine the impact of
changes in leadership and winning coalitions on the reliability of alliance com-
mitments. Using a sample of bilateral alliances between 1919 and 1989, these
scholars do not obtain evidence for an effect of changes in democratic winning
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coalitions or executive turnovers, however. That being said, Leeds et al. (2009)
find that changes in winning coalitions governing nondemocratic states increase
the risk of abrogating alliances. Finally, Tago (2009) investigates the withdrawals
from the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq for 2003–2006. While it does not seem
that leadership turnover per se makes defections more likely, Tago’s (2009)
results emphasize that countries were more likely to end their commitments in
election months.
Against this background, our research seeks to make a twofold contribution.
First, we intend to add to the literature that examines how political leadership
changes affect foreign policies. We do so by further developing existing theoreti-
cal arguments (Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer 2009) and testing the corre-
sponding theoretical framework for the case of military coalition operations.
Second, we also want to broaden the empirical range of the debate concerning
the reliability of security commitments (for example, Leeds 2003; Gartzke and
Gleditsch 2004; Pilster 2011). So far, the vast majority of research in this domain
focuses on the performance of alliances in interstate wars—a topic of possibly
declining policy relevance, primarily because these kinds of conflict have
substantially decreased in frequency since World War II (Buhaug, Gates, Hegre,
and Strand 2007). Moreover, recent policy debates focused on the behavior of
states participating in rather than leading coalition operations.3 However, existing
studies and data sets often consider the behavior of the states leading multilateral
interventions only (for example, Sullivan and Koch 2009; Koch and Sullivan
2010). Finally, the only existing study (Tago 2009) that directly examines the
determinants of defections from military coalitions is not fully generalizable, since
it investigates the behavior of democratic states in one single operation. In order
to address this, we employ newly collected data on all military coalition interven-
tions between 1946 and 2001. This enables us to broaden the empirical focus of
the reliability debate as contributions to military coalition operations also consti-
tute a “testing ground” for the reliability of security commitments.
Theoretical Framework: Do Leadership Changes Affect Withdrawals from
Military Coalition Operations?
In general, a state should remain in a coalition operation as long as the net
benefits from participation do persist. However, even if the circumstances change
to a degree and the benefits decrease somewhat, a political leader may not neces-
sarily decide to end the military deployment as this is costly. Costs arise, for exam-
ple, because other members of a coalition might consider the withdrawal as a
defection from existing commitments and, in turn, exert pressure on the poten-
tial defectors (Tago 2009:225f; see also Leeds et al. 2009:466). In light of this, we
argue that three factors influence a political leader’s cost-benefit analysis and can
make it ultimately more likely that changes in the political leadership of a country
induce a premature withdrawal from an ongoing military coalition operation.
More specifically, our theoretical framework builds on and extends the work of
Stanley (2009; see also Stanley and Sawyer 2009) by focusing on (i) leaders’ pref-
erences, (ii) leaders’ available information, and (iii) leaders’ levels of entrapment.
The Role of Preferences
Different political leaders tend to have diverse beliefs about military intervention
strategies (Stanley and Sawyer 2009:657; see also Stanley 2009). These varying
beliefs result in contrasting evaluations of the net benefits a state can derive
3See, for example, the debates on the Canadian, Dutch, and French withdrawals from the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan.
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from participating in a military coalition. Thus, political leaders may highly differ
in their preferences about a country’s contribution to military coalition opera-
tions—and with regard to its withdrawal from these.
In more detail, different political leaders are likely to have dissimilar “opera-
tional codes” (George 1969; Walker and Schafer 2010) that are compartmental-
ized into schemata, which vary along specific issue domains. These domain-
specific schemata encompass “philosophical beliefs” that may affect a political
leader’s diagnosis of, for example, her state’s grand strategies. For example,
political leaders could differ in whether they see foreign policy as essentially har-
monious or conflictive, or in their identification of threats and their origins
(Walker 1983:181ff; Saunders 2009:129ff). Consistent with these diagnostic pro-
pensities, leaders also have different “instrumental beliefs” that highlight appro-
priate strategies and tactics for achieving goals in military interventions (Bennett
1999:26ff). Therefore, political leaders who perceive threats as originating within
political institutions of other states are likely to believe in transformative inter-
vention strategies that aim at changing the target’s domestic political setting.
Conversely, the treatment of threats as the result of an anarchic international sys-
tem may lead to military intervention strategies that aim at foreign policy
restraint, that is, efforts to influence the external behavior of other states without
altering their domestic institutions per se (Saunders 2009:123ff; see also Jentle-
son 1992:53f).
Against this background, we believe that different operational codes have
implications for the cost-benefit calculus of leaders. First, different political lead-
ers assess the general costs and benefits of a military intervention policy in differ-
ent ways. State leaders who are more inclined toward a conflictive view of
international affairs evaluate the use of military force more positively. Second,
different operational codes are likely to result in different investments in military
capabilities, making the implementation of certain types of military interventions
more or less costly. Leaders who diagnose the internal organization of states as
the source of threats focus on the enhancement and use of their military’s coun-
terinsurgency capacities. Leaders more inclined toward strategies of foreign pol-
icy restraint, on the other hand, tend to favor investments into their armies’
conventional capabilities (Saunders 2009:137ff).
That being said, these philosophical and instrumental beliefs are stable and
unlikely to change over the course of office of a political leader (Saunders
2009:131f).4 Consequently, new intervention strategies based on alternative
threat perceptions are more likely to be implemented when we see a change in
a country’s political leadership (Levy 1994:286; Bennett 1999:114ff). We there-
fore contend that leadership turnover is a necessary condition for changes in
military intervention strategies and that changes in the political leadership are
hence likely to be positively associated with a country’s premature withdrawal
from an ongoing military coalition operation.5
4An anonymous reviewer emphasized that this claim can be contested on empirical grounds, for example, as
seen during US President George W. Bush’s tenure. However, such a change seems to be the exception rather than
the rule, and we tend to keep our argument that philosophical and instrumental beliefs—especially with regard to
military (intervention) policies—are, in fact, stable. This claim is also in accordance with Renshon’s (2008) study of
Bush’s operational code. While the traumatic experience of the 9/11 terrorist attacks did lead to some significant
changes in Bush’s philosophical beliefs about world politics, “Bush’s overall operational code can still be described
as relatively stable, with only three out of 10 indices experiencing a statistically significant change” (Renshon
2008:836). Moreover, Bush’s instrumental beliefs about world politics remained virtually unchanged throughout his
two terms in office.
5Concerning the direction of this change, it seems plausible to assume that the original decision to participate
in a multilateral military intervention was in accordance with the original leader’s philosophical and instrumental
beliefs on military intervention strategies. Consequently, subsequent changes in the political leadership increase the
probability that a leader will take over whose operational code is less in accordance with her country’s participation
in the coalition operation.
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The Role of Information Evaluation
As stated, political leaders are likely to end their country’s contribution to a mili-
tary coalition if they become aware of reduced net benefits. Leaders who fail
realizing this may refrain from withdrawing their troops, though. We argue that
the way in which political leaders process information can explain this failure
(Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer 2009). First, different leaders could evaluate
the very same information on military coalition operations in a diverse fashion.
For example, some leaders may require less information for decision making,
they display a low receptivity toward feedback, and they are more likely to reject
alternatives. Others, on the contrary, demand a higher amount of information,
are interested in negative feedback, and are more open toward alternative
courses of action (Young and Schafer 1998:84ff; Bennett 1999:94f). Ultimately, a
change in the political leadership is likely to go hand in hand with different
modes of information processing, as there is substantial variation in the concep-
tual complexities of political leaders (Hermann 1980).
Second, a political leader might also be subject to motivated and unmotivated
biases when processing information (see Jervis 2006:650ff; Levy 2003:263ff).
This can induce leaders—who decided to participate in a military coalition
operation in the first place—to persist on a failing course instead of re-evaluat-
ing their situation. On the one hand, political leaders avoid cognitive disso-
nances through modifying perceptions of incoming information. Leaders may,
for instance, simply suppress information on how their country’s participation
fails in a military coalition operation to produce the desired benefits. Military
intervention decisions are especially likely to cause dissonance-reducing patterns
of information processing, since they entail high degrees of psychological com-
mitment (see Jervis 1976:382ff, 2006:652; Vertzberger 1998:55f, 73f). On the
other hand, concerning unmotivated biases, coalition campaigns require exten-
sive military and political planning (Vertzberger 1998:49). Because of the high
levels of uncertainty inherent to this process, leaders frequently rely on “rules
of thumb,” for example, representativeness, availability, or anchoring and adjust-
ment heuristics (Bennett 1999:91ff), which trigger that leaders persist on a
course in a military operation despite evidence for failure. New leaders who
were not involved in the original participation decision are usually not subject
to both types of bias.
These two mechanisms suggest that new leaders may evaluate information
about the progress of a military intervention less positively than their predeces-
sors and, as a result, perceive their country to receive lower benefits from the
participation in a coalition operation. Thus, changes in leadership should be
more conducive to the withdrawal from ongoing military coalition operations.
The Role of Entrapment
“Old” leaders—even if they might want to withdraw their troops from an ongo-
ing operation—could also face the danger of entrapment by prohibitive costs,
which are imposed by their own constituencies or foreign allies (Stanley 2009;
Stanley and Sawyer 2009:657; Croco 2011). Thus, political leaders decide to con-
tinue participating in a military coalition even if the net benefits decrease—and
a premature withdrawal becomes only possible with the change of the political
leadership as such. First, there are usually interest groups and political factions
at the domestic level that condition their support to a leader on their country’s
participation in a specific military coalition operation. On the one hand, these
factions may be willing to sanction leaders because of a direct interest in their
country’s continued participation in such a coalition. Industrial sectors inter-
ested in certain foreign policies, bureaucratic groups implementing military
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intervention decisions, or members of the winning coalition are all potential
veto players (Vertzberger 1998:105ff; Bennett 1999:100f; Leeds et al. 2009:463f).
On the other hand, leaders deciding to participate in a military coalition typi-
cally invest political capital to find support for their intervention policies. Drop-
ping out of a multilateral effort may thus signal inconsistency, triggering
disapproval even by those members of the winning coalition who originally
opposed a military intervention in question (see Weeks 2008:40; Stanley
2009:55f).
Second, leaders who decided to participate in a military coalition operation in
the first place might not only become entrapped by domestic constituents, but
also by foreign allies (Stanley and Sawyer 2009:657f). Political leaders have
reason to worry about the international consequences of a damaged reputation
if they defect from a military coalition (see Gibler 2008). In addition, the domes-
tic political survival of leaders might directly depend on foreign allies, giving the
former incentives to present themselves as reliable partners that do not prema-
turely withdraw from military coalitions (see Belkin 2005:27f; Stanley and Sawyer
2009:657f). For example, Zairean dictator Mobutu could only secure his political
survival via the assistance of and reliance on his French patrons (Kisangani
2000).
A change in the political leadership can overcome these dependencies, how-
ever. New leaders represent new constituencies with interests that may be differ-
ent from those that supported a military intervention in the first place (see
McGillivray and Stam 2004:160ff; Leeds et al. 2009:463ff; Croco 2011). Moreover,
new leaders might also be forced to withdraw their troops due to domestic tur-
moil. The times of leadership change—especially in nondemocratic regimes—
are frequently associated with instability, prompting leaders to withdraw their
forces from coalition operations abroad to fend off potential challenges at home
(Gelpi and Grieco 2001:800ff; see also Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003:292ff).
Finally, winning coalitions and foreign allies might be more tolerant toward
political leaders terminating inherited commitments if these leaders did not
invest their own political capital for the intervention decision, that is, decided to
participate in a military coalition in the first place (Vertzberger 1998:51ff).
Hypothesis
Our theoretical framework argues that three factors make it more likely that a
political leadership turnover leads to a premature withdrawal from an ongoing
military coalition operation. First, new leaders may have preferences about mili-
tary interventions that differ from the interests of the previous incumbent. Also,
new leaders evaluate information, which is relevant for military operations and
their success, differently. Third, new political leaders may be less entrapped in
ongoing military intervention policies stemming from domestic constituencies or
foreign allies.
Note that leadership change does not deterministically induce that any of the
three factors applies, however.6 New leaders are not uniformly more likely, for
example, to evaluate information differently. Nevertheless, leadership turnover
should signal that one, two, or all of the presented factors do operate. In some
cases, the three mechanisms can simultaneously work together to increase the
likelihood that a new political leader will decide to withdraw in a premature
fashion. However, in other cases, one of the mechanisms on its own might play
the crucial role to lead to defection from a coalition. What the theoretical frame-
work (Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer 2009) suggests is that the observed net
effect of a leadership turnover is likely to cause an early withdrawal from military
6We return to this issue in the conclusion.
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coalitions. We therefore seek to test the following hypothesis: A change in the polit-
ical leadership of a country increases the risk of its premature withdrawal from an ongoing
military coalition.
Research Design
Data
Building on the International Military Interventions (IMI) data (Pearson and
Baumann 1993; Pickering and Kisangani 2009), we compiled a new data set on
all state participations in military coalition interventions between 1946 and
2001.7 For our purposes, we considered a military intervention from the IMI data
if a coalition in its entirety entailed an incursion into a target country that was
comprised of more than 1,000 soldiers and if the coalition’s mission either
consisted of intimidation or combat. This restricts our data to cases with signifi-
cant numbers of combat-ready soldiers and, as a result, ensures the homogeneity
of our analyzed observations. We then coded those selected cases (i) as unilat-
eral if only one country intervened and (ii) as military coalition operations if the
troops of two or more countries conducted combined operations, that is, if they
fought together. Due to these criteria, we obtained 199 interventions in total
between 1946 and 2001, with 156 unilateral interventions and 43 military opera-
tions that were conducted by a coalition of states.
We then focused on the 43 coalition operations, which we disaggregated along
participants so that our unit of analysis constitutes a single participating country
of a military operation. To this end, in a first step, we classified countries of a
military coalition as “lead states” or “(simple) coalition participants.”8 Criteria
for the identification of lead states, that is, states that have the leading role in a
given coalition, are the presence and number of troops supplied at the onset of
an operation, command and control arrangements, the average number of
troops supplied over the course of an operation, and the duration of a country’s
contribution.9 Lead states were then excluded from our analysis in order to pre-
serve a homogenous sample.10
In a second step, we applied a number of thresholds to code countries as
actual coalition troop contributors, with the ultimate purpose to exclude those
states whose troop contributions were below these thresholds.11 This treatment
excludes, for example, cases where lead states merely use minor troop contribu-
tions from other states to legitimize their interventions toward domestic and
international audiences (see Kreps 2009). In total, our final cross-section data
consist of 143 different troop contributions to military coalition operations by 62
different states.
7Additional explanations for the data compilation are given in the Appendix.
8The distinction between lead states and coalition participants has also beenmade by Sullivan andKoch (2009) whose
coding of coalition interventions focuses on the state constituting “the primary motivating and contributing force” of a
multilateraloperation.
9Lead states do not necessarily have to be major powers: Only 20 of the 43 coalition operations in our sample
were led by major powers as defined by the Correlates of War project (Singer 1988). Conversely, our sample also
contains 21 instances of major powers making troop contributions to a multilateral military intervention without
leading the coalition.
10Including lead states would lead to a sample violating assumptions of unit homogeneity, as lead states have a
motivation in “getting the job done” that differs from regular coalition participants. Unlike regular coalition partici-
pants, lead states are willing to bear the additional diplomatic and military costs of building and commanding a
coalition. Within the cost-benefit model that guides our theoretical framework, this implies that the political execu-
tives in lead states expect significantly higher benefits and/or lower costs.
11These thresholds are listed in the Appendix.
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Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable codes if a country prematurely withdraws from an
ongoing military coalition operation. More specifically, we first gathered infor-
mation on when and how states ended their contribution for each of the 143
different troop contributions to military coalition operations. On the one hand,
we generally considered a country having terminated its contribution once the
overall coalition troops’ direction or mission changes or once all coalition
troops have departed from the intervention’s target country. On the other
hand, we treat a state as having defected from a military coalition if it (i) with-
drew early or (ii) changed the intervention’s direction or the mission of the
troops it contributed before the lead state did so,12 while historical evidence
had to point to related disagreements between the lead state and the coalition
participant.13
While early withdrawals pertaining to individual country troop pull-outs before
the coalition operation in its entirety officially ended are a relatively straightfor-
ward concept, defections through changes in the intervention’s direction and
troops’ mission may merit further explanation. We include these special cases of
defection, since we believe that the definition of early withdrawals from a coali-
tion operation should go beyond the “conventional” definitions of troop with-
drawals. An example of a state defecting by unilaterally changing its troops’
mission is given by France’s contribution to the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan.
While France left some residual forces in theater, these troops have explicitly
been ordered to refrain from combat at a time when the coalition’s lead state,
the United States, as well as other coalition participants still pursue combat oper-
ations throughout the country actively.
Moreover, the idea of defection through changes in the intervention’s direc-
tion includes instances when former allies start fighting. The rationale behind
this is illustrated by Rwanda’s participation in the Anti-Kabila Coalition in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While Rwanda did not withdraw its
troops from or cease combat operations in the DRC (the target state of the inter-
vention) in 1999, it still terminated its contribution to the Ugandan–Rwandan
coalition by changing the intervention direction and initiating armed clashes
with Ugandan forces.14
Against this background, our final dependent variable receives a value of 1 if a
country defected from an ongoing military coalition according to our definitions
and 0 otherwise. Overall, we classified 19 different troop contributions to mili-
tary coalition operations that ended in such a way.
Explanatory Variables
Our core explanatory variable is a binary item measuring whether a country sees
at least one change in the political leadership during its contribution to a
12We do not code coalition defections if they were ordered or welcomed by the lead state. The Soviet Union,
for instance, ordered its coalition partners that participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to withdraw
in order to avoid potential difficulties with their allies’ troop morale.
13According to our definition, the end of a country’s troop contribution to a coalition can coincide with overall
war termination. However, premature withdrawals from coalitions are supposed to take place before the lead state
terminates the military intervention. This is mirrored by our data, since the defection of coalition members tempo-
rally pre-dates the termination of the overall military intervention by the lead state in 18 of the 19 cases of defec-
tion. The only exception is Rwanda’s participation in the Anti-Kabila Coalition. This, however, is a result of the
coding rules: August 7, 1999, was the first reported armed clash between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Congo.
Afterward, consequently, both countries are coded as having started a new unilateral intervention.
14Empirically, however, only two out of 19 defections pertain to ceasefires and one defection out of 19 consti-
tutes a case of “switching sides.” Excluding these cases from our analysis does not affect the substance of our find-
ings.
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military coalition operation (1) or not (0).15 We also coded a country as having
experienced a leadership turnover if the change was announced before the
actual withdrawal from a military coalition.16 We obtained the information on
political leadership turnovers from the Archigos data (Goemans, Gleditsch, and
Chiozza 2009). Our data comprise such changes for 33 cases.17
Furthermore, we control for other variables pertaining to three clusters that
may also affect the net benefits from participating in coalition operations as
well as the potential costs resulting from defection. First, we consider variables
on the characteristics of coalition participants. Generally, democratic leaders
face higher costs for reneging on commitments (for example, Leeds 2003).
By using the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2004), we coded coalition
participants as democratic if they had a combined polity score of +6 or higher
in the onset year of a military coalition operation. We also include a binary
variable that scores the value of 1 if a country held national-level elections
during its participation, since the benefits of a defection from a military oper-
ation frequently exceed the costs during election times (Tago 2009). We take
the election data from Regan, Frank, and Clark (2009) as well as Goeman’s
extension of the Archigos data (Goemans et al. 2009). Third, we additionally
take into account that the effects of leadership changes and elections might
vary by regime type. We therefore interact these two variables with the democ-
racy item.18 Finally, we control for states’ capabilities as measured by the
Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Index (Singer 1988). More
powerful states are less reliable actors, because they usually face less severe
consequences in case of defecting from a coalition participation (Leeds
2003:813ff).
Second, we include three variables that measure interventions’ characteristics.
On the one hand, biased military interventions either support or oppose a target
country’s government in a conflict and are associated with more “direct” bene-
fits. However, interventions, which are neutral toward the target state’s govern-
ment, “are deployed to cease or mitigate the ongoing conflict rather than taking
the government’s or opposition groups’ side for victory” (Peksen 2012:560) and
have less tangible benefits (Regan 2002:112ff). While a state’s benefits from
empowering its allies and weakening its opponents in a conflict are more obvi-
ous, conflict resolution may have the paradox effect of strengthening political
forces which are potentially unfriendly to the intervening states. We, thus, incor-
porate a binary variable measuring whether a country’s participation in a military
coalition was neutral (1) or not (0). We expect this variable to be positively
15If not stated otherwise, the data for these variables have been taken from the IMI data.
16Canada’s participation in UNITAF/UNOSOM II for 1992–1993 is the only case that is affected by this rule.
Canada ceased operations in Somalia on June 15, 1993, but Kim Campbell did not officially succeed Brian Mulro-
ney as the Canadian Prime Minister until June 25, 1993. Campbell, however, had already been designated as Mulro-
ney’s successor on March 14, 1993.
17One might object to our approach that incorporating how leadership change occurred, for example, a conser-
vative government takes over from a liberal one, would lead to even more accurate predictions about the with-
drawal from ongoing military coalitions. However, the lack of data prevents us from doing so. In more detail, we
are confronted with an “empty-cells problem” as there are only two cases in our data where a democratic country
experienced a change in the winning coalition and then withdrew from a coalition operation: Italy/MNF in Leba-
non saw a shift to the left (August 04, 1983: Christian Democrats are followed by a Socialist-led coalition govern-
ment) and Ireland/UNFICYP in Cyprus experienced a shift toward the right (March 14, 1973: Fianna Fail is
followed by Fine Gael).
18With regard to the interaction term comprising leadership change and democracy, note that this approach
also allows for a more accurate test of the entrapment argument—at least at the domestic level. The level of domes-
tic entrapment is mainly determined by the size of a country’s winning coalition, which is highly correlated with a
country’s level of democracy (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). This also makes sense from a theoretical perspective,
since democratic institutions facilitate removing a political leader (Croco 2011:463). The following conditional
effect of leader change on the risk of withdrawing from military coalitions is then captured by including the multi-
plicative term of leadership change and democracy.
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related to defections from military coalition operations.19 Moreover, when a mili-
tary coalition intervenes into a country’s domestic dispute, this intervention usu-
ally enjoys less legitimacy and therefore coalition participants face lower costs
from a possible withdrawal (Tago 2007:186ff). The definitions and data for this
and the previous variable were taken from the IMI data. Finally, we consider a
count item on the number of coalition members, since larger coalitions are
likely to reduce the individual costs of withdrawal (Bennett and Stam 1996).
Third, there are variables on the geostrategic importance of a military coali-
tion operation and items on a country’s specific contribution to such interven-
tions. Geographic distance is a crucial predictor for states’ willingness to
militarily assist other countries (Russett and Nincic 1976). Hence, we include the
logged capital-to-capital distances between (i) a coalition participant and the
target state as well as (ii) a coalition participant and the lead state of an interven-
tion. We expect both variables to be positively signed. In addition, the costs
stemming from participating in a military coalition operation should arguably be
positively related to defections (Goemans 2000). Some audiences, however,
might view costs as investments to be redeemed, which implies a negative corre-
lation between costs and defections (Sullivan 2008a,b). In order to control for
this possibility, we take variables measuring (i) the duration of a contribution,
(ii) the maximum number of troops contributed by a coalition participant, and
(iii) whether an intervention’s mission consisted of combat or intimidation (see
Regan 2002:105f; Eichenberg 2006).20
Quantitative Parametric Analysis: Logistic Regression Models
We test our theoretical argument via a multi-methods approach. Our first step
here constitutes logistic regression models that are summarized in Table 1. The
first model only incorporates the variable for political leadership turnover while
controlling for two other institutional characteristics of coalition participants,
that is, regime type and elections. Model 2 adds the capability variable and con-
trols for the characteristics of a military intervention. The third model considers
in addition variables on the geostrategic importance of a coalition operation and
variables describing the nature of a country’s specific contribution to the inter-
vention, while Model 4 constitutes our full model with the two interaction terms.
We cluster the standard errors on individual multilateral efforts for capturing
possible intra-group error correlations.
Table 1 highlights that the parametric analysis finds strong and robust support
for our hypothesis, since Leader Change is positively signed and statistically signifi-
cant—regardless of the model specification we employ. More substantially, the
models without the interaction terms reveal that the likelihood of a premature
withdrawal from a coalition operation increases on average by 10.21% if coun-
tries actually see a political leadership turnover. In other words, the risk that
countries defect from ongoing military coalition operations does indeed increase
if we observe a change in the political leadership.
We also obtain interesting findings with regard to the control variables.21 First
and as expected, states are significantly more likely to defect from neutral inter-
ventions and from military coalition operations that intervene into other states’
domestic disputes. When moving from the minimum toward the maximum of
Neutrality and Domestic Dispute, the likelihood that a state withdraws from a coali-
tion increases on average by 23.83% and 46.87%, respectively. Table 1 also
19Prominent examples of coalition interventions coded as neutral in our sample include the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and the “Operation des Nations Unies au Congo.”
20The descriptive statistics for all variables are summarized in the Appendix.
21We only discuss those controls that reveal a consistently significant impact.
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demonstrates that states are more likely to drop out of an ongoing operation
with an increasing distance to the target state of an intervention. Surprisingly,
however, coalition participants that are geographically closer to the lead state of
a military operation are more likely to withdraw. A potential explanation for this
might stem from the development of more intense interest conflicts between
geographically close coalition participants and lead states. For example, Rwanda
and Uganda jointly intervened into Congo to overthrow the government of
Laurent–Desire Kabila in August 1998. However, a military conflict over the sup-
port for different factions of the main Congolese rebel group broke out between
the two interveners one year afterward. This was the result of the security and
economic interests both countries had in expanding their individual zones of
influence in Eastern Congo. Finally, countries are also less likely to defect from
a military coalition operation the longer they already participated.
In order to interpret the interaction terms in Model 4, we calculated simulated
predicted probabilities for the various scenarios of Leader Change, Democracy, and
Election. Table 2 presents our findings of which three seem particularly interest-
ing. First, changes in the political leadership approximately double the risk of a
defection regardless if we examine (non) democracies or take into account elec-
tions. Essentially, this mirrors our results from Models 1–3 above, as the effect of
political leadership turnover remains substantial and consistent under all scenar-
ios.
Second, democratic states are ceteris paribus less likely to defect from coalition
operations than nondemocratic regimes, which is also indicated by the signifi-
cant coefficient estimate for the democracy variable in Model 4. However, the
magnitude of this effect is strongly conditioned by whether states hold elections
in the course of a coalition operation or not. On the one hand, if a democratic
regime sees at least one election while participating in a military coalition opera-
tion, the risk of that country withdrawing its troops from the intervention
increases by the factor three. This finding supports Tago’s (2009) argument on
the strategic position taking of democratic leaders, who tend to break interna-
tional commitments in times of elections for achieving policy congruence with
their electorates. An interesting example of this is offered by the Australian
participation in UNITAF/UNOSOM II in Somalia between December 1992 and
May 1993. Here, the Australian Labor government under Paul Keating insisted
on the early withdrawal of the Australian troops. This position was adopted to
neutralize potential opposition attacks on this military intervention well before
the Australian national parliamentary elections in March 1993. On the other
hand, elections in nondemocratic states seem to have the opposite effect. When
nondemocratic regimes participate in a coalition operation and have at least one
election during that time, they become less likely to defect from an intervention.
We explain this result by the incentive of nondemocratic states to hold elections:
to gain support—either at the domestic or international level—against possible
threats to their rule (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Due to the fact that this
incentive mirrors the reasons why nondemocracies reliably contribute to multilat-
TABLE 2. Interaction Effects of Democracy, Election, and Leader Change
Democracy No Democracy
Leader Change No Leader Change Leader Change No Leader Change
Election 0.051 0.025 0.062 0.028
No Election 0.016 0.008 0.131 0.059
(Note. Table entries are simulated predicted probabilities that are calculated while holding all other variables at
their median values.)
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eral military efforts, we obtain the somewhat surprising effect of elections on the
premature withdrawal from coalition operations for these kinds of regimes. In
order to illustrate this, consider the Zairian participation in a French-led inter-
vention in Chad between July 1983 and November 1984. Zaire made a substan-
tial troop contribution and only withdrew its forces after the French had ceased
operations anyway. Moreover, Zaire also held presidential elections in July 1984.
We believe that both circumstances contributed to the outcome that Zairean dic-
tator Mobutu secured his political survival as he secured French support against
internal challenges such as rebellions and likewise strengthened his domestic
legitimacy by holding relatively free elections (see Kisangani 2000).
In sum, these findings indicate that the higher reliability often attributed to
democratic commitments largely disappears (but not completely), once we com-
pare democratic states in electoral periods with nondemocratic regimes holding
elections. This result is also mirrored by recent work on signaling in interstate
disputes, which shows that the credibility of threats issued by “electoral
authoritarian” states only differs from democracies marginally (Kinne and
Marinov 2013).
Quantitative Non-Parametric Analysis: Matching
Against the background of our parametric analysis, note that political leadership
turnovers are unlikely to be a randomly selected set. Potential strategies for deal-
ing with non-random assignments and issues of causal inference in quantitative
analyses either pertain to an instrumental variable approach or the use of selec-
tion estimators. However, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) demonstrate that these
purely parametric strategies rely on unverifiable modeling assumptions or are
generally unable to deal with the influence of other existent covariates.
Matching is a more effective solution in this regard. It is “a methodology for
reducing bias due to observed covariates in observational studies for causal
effects” (Rubin and Thomas 1996:249), that is, it corrects for the non-random
assignment and controls for the existence of confounding factors (Ho et al.
2007; Morgan and Winship 2007). Matching pre-processes the data to form
quasi-experimental contrasts by sampling a subset of comparable cases from the
overall pool of observations. The observations contained in this subset “match
up” each other as closely as possible, that is, the differences due to the con-
founding factors are reduced to a minimum and should be virtually non-existent.
The only—and actually crucial—exception is that these “most similar” cases dif-
fer in whether they received the treatment (political leadership turnover) or not
(no political leadership turnover). Based on this, our inferences are more accu-
rate, since any differences between the two sets (treatment vs control group) are
then solely attributed to the treatment (see Gilligan and Sergenti 2008).
We employ genetic one-to-one matching with replacement (Sekhon 2007;
Diamond and Sekhon 2013), that is, we obtain a matched sample of 66 observa-
tions due to the fact that our original data identified 33 different troop contribu-
tions to military coalition operations from states that experienced a change in
the political leadership.22 We used eight variables to match observations from
the treatment group with those from the control group: Democracy, Election, Neu-
trality, Domestic Dispute, Distance Target State, Distance Lead State, No. of Coalition
Members, and Troops. This set of variables proved to be optimal with regard to the
overall achieved balance for the matched sample. We refrained from matching
on all explanatory variables due to two reasons. First, this would not avoid
matched samples with still significant imbalances. Second, in the words of Ho
et al. (2007:216f):
22The Appendix lists these cases in detail.
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The theoretical literature emphasizes that including variables only weakly related
to treatment assignments usually reduces bias more than it will increase variance,
and so most believe that all available control variables should always be included.
However, the theoretical literature has focused primarily on the case where the
pool of potential control units is considerably larger than the set of treated units.
Some researchers seem to have incorrectly generalized this advice to all datasets.
If, as is often the case, the pool of potential control units is not much larger than
the pool of treated units, then always including all available control variables is
bad advice. Instead, the familiar econometric rules apply about the trade-off
between the bias of excluding relevant variables and the inefficiency of including
irrelevant ones: researchers should not include every pre-treatment covariate
available.
Hence, our approach corresponds to the general genetic algorithm used by Sek-
hon (2007:12ff), which, in technical terms, maximizes the smallest p-value for t-
tests in each iteration of the matching procedure and, thus, maximizes the
balance between treatment and control groups.
Before and after the matching, we assessed the degree of this balance for the
explanatory items. Figure 1 depicts our findings via two common balance statis-
tics: The left panel shows the standardized bias, while values within [0.25; 0.25]
indicate that a variable is well balanced (Ho et al. 2007:220); for the second
panel, we report the p-values of t-tests (0.10 as threshold level) in order to iden-
tify whether real differences between the treatment and the control group do
persist or not (Diamond and Sekhon 2013:20ff). Figure 1 highlights that the dis-
tribution of most explanatory variables significantly differs between the treated
and the control group before we matched observations. After the matching, how-
ever, our sample displays a substantially improved balance to the extent that we
can hardly distinguish between observations in either group and the only real
difference between observations actually is the treatment: All standardized biases
range within [0.25; 0.25] and the p-values for the t-tests are all well above the
value of 0.1.
Based on the matching, Ho et al. (2007:211f) suggest using the same paramet-
ric estimator with the same set of controls for the matched data that one would
have employed in the first place, that is, before the matching. Due to the use of
Democracy
Election
Democracy*Election
Capabilities
Neutrality
Domestic
No. Coalition Members
Distance Target State
Distance Lead State
Duration
Troops
Combat
1.25-0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Standardized Bias
x Before Matching
+ After Matching
Democracy
Election
Democracy*Election
Capabilities
Neutrality
Domestic
No. Coalition Members
Distance Target State
Distance Lead State
Duration
Troops
Combat
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Student's t-test
FIG 1. Sample Balance—Before and After Matching. Note. Vertical dashed lines pertain to the interval
[0.25; 0.25] for the standardized bias and the threshold value of 0.10 for the Student’s t-test.
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the matched sample, however, the importance of the functional form that is
characteristic for any parametric estimator is significantly lowered, specification
assumptions matter less, and the reliability of the results is more strongly given.23
Table 3 summarizes our findings using the matched sample for re-estimating the
first two models and a reduced version of Model 3 from Table 1. The results
provide further support for our hypothesis. The variable capturing changes in a
coalition participant’s political leadership remains significant at conventional
levels—even after removing the differences between the treatment and the con-
trol group. The effect of leadership turnover is even stronger than in Table 1,
that is, we obtain simulated first differences ranging in [0.11; 0.28]. This mirrors
the claim of Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) that purely parametric analyses might
underestimate the actual effect of variables if we do not correct for non-random
assignments.
Qualitative Analysis: Most Similar Design Case Study of South Korea and
Australia in South Vietnam, 1965–1973
Finally, we conducted one most similar design case study as a last empirical test.
For selecting this case, we first chose seven observations that display variation in
the dependent variable in the matched sample of the 33 pairs of cases. Out of
these seven observations, we dropped cases where a leader turnover was accom-
panied by a change in the winning coalition and then selected the pair of the
South Korean and Australian contributions to the US-led military coalition in
South Vietnam in order to illustrate more thoroughly how differences in prefer-
ences between leaders can affect coalition behavior. Due to this procedure, we
obtained a pair of cases with a most similar design (Gerring 2008:668f; Fearon
and Laitin 2008).
In a first step, we discuss the similarities of our control covariates for the
South Korean and Australian contributions in order to ensure the most similar
design (see Gerring 2008:668f; Fearon and Laitin 2008). This mission was a non-
neutral intervention with the purpose of supporting South Vietnam, while the
differences in the domestic institutions between the two participants were
relatively minor. Although South Korea was not a democracy during its participa-
tion in the military coalition (1965–1973), the “Third Republic of South Korea,”
which lasted until 1972, saw relatively free and open national elections. Opposi-
tion parties were represented and had possibilities to voice their dissent. More-
TABLE 3. Withdrawing from Military Coalition Operations—Matched Sample
Model 5
(Based on Model 1)
Model 6
(Based on Model 2)
Model 7
(Based on Model 3)
Coefficient Estimate 1.480 (0.636)** 1.682 (0.899)* 4.240 (1.261)***
First Difference 0.281 0.185 0.110
Observations 66 66 66
Log Pseudo-Likelihood 19.11 15.54 7.25
Wald v2 16.61*** 33.48*** 40.40***
Notes. Table entries are coefficients for Leader Change or first differences; standard errors of coefficient estimates
clustered on individual coalition efforts in parentheses; control variables included but not reported; first differences
calculated for a change from “no leadership turnover” to “leadership turnover” while holding all other variables at
median values.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% (two-tailed).
23The confounding factors are only included for addressing any remaining imbalances, but an interpretation is
not possible. Due to the low level of degrees of freedom in Model 7, we dropped No. Coalition Members and Combat,
however, because both variables do not have statistical significance in any model of Table 1.
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over, South Korea and Australia were largely similar in their military–industrial
capabilities and both states were fighting in a target state, which we consider as
being part of their home region due to the geographic distance between
Vietnam and South Korean and Australia, respectively. Furthermore, South
Korea and Australia supported the United States during that mission—a geo-
graphically remote lead state that was nevertheless essential for either security.
Finally, both South Korea and Australia fought in that coalition for more than
six years, made substantial troop contributions of more than 5,000 troops each,
and suffered from severe casualties in the course of combat operations.24
Against this background, a major difference between South Korea and Austra-
lia constitutes the political leadership. South Korea—unlike Australia—did not
experience a political leadership turnover during the course of the military oper-
ation: Park Chung-hee remained in power (1961–1979) during the entire period
of his country’s participation in the Vietnam War.
More specifically with regard to our outlined mechanisms, Park’s operational
code viewed international relations in Asia as an essentially conflictive endeavor
marked by the permanent Chinese and Soviet attempts to instigate local com-
munist challenges. He therefore wanted to save South Vietnam from Communist
infiltration in order to ensure the survival of his own state (Yi 2002:646ff; Levin
and Han 2002:16ff). As a result, Park decided to uphold the South Korean con-
tribution in Vietnam—despite rising casualty rates, increasing resistance from his
domestic political opposition, and a worsening relationship with North Korea—
and even complied with the American request to leave its remaining 37,000
troops in South Vietnam until the United States ceased operations in March
1973 (Lee 1973:96).25
Australia, on the other hand, was governed by four different prime ministers
during the participation in the Vietnam War, that is, Robert Gordon Menzies
(1949–1966), Harold Edward Holt (1966–1967), John Grey Gorton (1968–1971),
and William McMahon (1971–1972). Although all four executive leaders
belonged to the Liberal Party and, thereby, represented the same winning coali-
tion, they differed substantially in their operational codes. The grand strategic
beliefs of Menzies and Holt were based on the idea of a “forward defense” con-
taining communist aggression. According to these leaders, multilateral transfor-
mative military interventions such as in Vietnam were supposed to help
countries’ domestic political institutions facing local communist challenges,
hence neutralizing threats before they could reach Australian territory (Van der
Kroef 1969:214f). However, the successor of Holt, John Gorton, questioned the
reliability of Australia’s allies and did not consider Australia’s capabilities to be
sufficiently strong for a forward-defense strategy. Instead, Gorton preferred
Australian-based forces that focused on restraining other nations’ foreign poli-
cies through deterring a conventional military attack (Van der Kroef 1969:316).
Consequently, the decisive leadership change—as it should follow from this case
study—is the one from Holt to Gorton as Gorton was in favor of a termination
of the Australian military commitment. In fact, Gorton announced the gradual
withdrawal of all Australian troops in December 1969. The following two years
were marked by negotiations between Australia and the United States on the
proceedings of the Australian withdrawal, before Gorton’s successor McMahon
24However, the South Korean contribution was substantially larger as its troop contingent comprised more than
50,000 soldiers at its peak (Australia: 7,672). Also, South Korea incurred about 4,687 killed soldiers (Australia: 519).
25South Korea also derived substantial economic benefits from its participation, for example, foreign earnings
provided by the United States and an increased role in South Vietnam’s economy. Australia’s economic benefits
were substantially lower. Arguably, this might have been another factor making South Korea the more reliable ally.
However, historical evidence indicates that this aid was only granted, because the United States expected South
Korea to be the less reliable partner anyway (Tago 2008:6f).
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eventually ordered the last Australian troops to cease combat operations in
November 1971 (Larsen and Collins 1985:101ff).
Conclusion
This article has argued that a change in the political leadership makes it more
likely that a country withdraws from ongoing military coalition operations. New
leaders frequently have different preferences about military interventions, evalu-
ate information differently, and are less likely to be entrapped in intervention pol-
icies stemming from domestic constituencies or foreign allies. We found strong
and robust empirical support for our claim by using newly collected data on mili-
tary coalition operations between 1946 and 2001 and by testing the hypothesis via
a multi-methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods.
Our theoretical framework and especially the corresponding empirical results
may make several contributions. First, this paper adds to the growing literature
on the effects of political leadership changes on foreign security policies, such as
war initiation and continuation (for example, Stanley 2009; Stanley and Sawyer
2009; Croco 2011). Second, our research bears relevance for the literature on
states’ security commitments (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; see Pilster 2011). For
example, we analyzed participations in various kinds of military coalitions by a
more diverse set of states, which generalizes Tago’s study (2009) on the with-
drawals from the coalition in Iraq between 2003 and 2006. We also add to the
debate on whether and when democracies are the more reliable allies (for exam-
ple, Leeds et al. 2009). Specifically, our findings show a more nuanced picture
than simply attributing higher reliability to democratic commitments. Overall,
democratic states may be (slightly) less likely to defect from ongoing military
coalition operations. However, the “democratic advantage” largely disappears as
soon as we compare democratic states in electoral periods with nondemocratic
regimes holding elections. Similarly, the fact that democratic political systems
are more likely to experience leadership changes further affects the reliability of
democratic commitments negatively.
Our study might also have important policy implications by helping us to
assess the degree of reliability of coalition participants. In the case of the ISAF,
for example, France already withdrew basically all of its troops by the end of
2012—well before the “official” end of the ISAF scheduled for 2014. Judging
from this study’s results, upcoming leader changes and elections will increase
the risk of additional withdrawals. These patterns are also likely to apply to other
military coalition operations worldwide, such as the French-led intervention in
Mali.
Finally, many issues for research remain and we outline a few avenues for fur-
ther work. For instance, we treated a military intervention, which a given state
may be contributing to, essentially as a static event, thus excluding conflict
dynamics. However, leadership changes in allied states and defections from an
intervening coalition, for example, could both be more likely to occur if the coali-
tion is losing or at least not winning the intervention in question. Similarly, it
might be of interest to examine not only defections, but also major escalations of
countries’ involvements in military coalition operations and how changes in politi-
cal leaders relate to them.26 In other words, disaggregating interventions and
examining the dynamics therein might give us an even more accurate picture
than it was possible in this study. We also did not fully differentiate between dif-
ferent forms of leader removal out of office. Some leader changes occur because
the previous leader died of natural causes or due to an accident. However, these
types of change may not necessarily be the same as a change that was the result of
26We thank the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.
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a coup or an election. Similarly, our interactive term between Leader Change and
Democracy distinguishes to some extent between the very different backgrounds
and types of leaders, but more accurate ways for doing this might exist. Also,
more nuanced hypotheses, like the change of the government from a right-wing
government to left-wing government would lead to a higher chance of premature
withdrawal of the troops, could be empirically tested. However, this should be
studied once we confirm that leadership changes generally lead to troops’ depar-
ture from a coalition—to which we sought to contribute with this research.
Hence, our theory and core findings apply in general, but we agree with Croco
(2011:459) in that future research may address leadership turnovers in a more di-
saggregated, that is, clear-cut fashion for answering why some leaders do not
decide to withdraw from military coalitions, whereas others choose to defect early.
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